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*THE NEED FOR A COURT OF TAX APPEALS
"Legislation concerning judicial organization throughout our history has been a very empiric response to very

4

definite needs." *

,
All

NTERNAL revenue collections for 1940 were less than five
billion dollars.' They averaged a good deal less than four billion dollars for the ten preceding years. Internal revenue taxes
itder thepresent law are estimated to yield over forty-three billion
dollars.! These facts have become comnionplace, but they cannot
for that reason be ignored. A tenfold increase in the amount of
revenue means a large increase in the number and complexity of
tax controversies. The burden of handling these cases will fall
primarily on the Bureau of Internal Revenue.' But the rules which
il control the Bureau will be made ultimately by the courts. And
" ultimately," long experience has shown, is likely in many cases
f be a very long time. Our present system for judicial review of
acases is badly adapted to meet the problems of tax administration which clearly lie ahead. It is the thesis of this article that, in
iaterest of taxpayers and the government alike, we should revite that system so that the important judicial function in tax cases
y be speedily and surely exercised.
far the largest proportion of tax controversies are handled
tratively. The Treasury has set up elaborate machinery
_""I2t1e disposition of these cases. This machinery is of course not
4slPRTER AND
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perfect. It can certainly be improved.' But it can in no event
work with real effectiveness unless the Treasury personnel can have
within a reasonable time the authoritative rules which are to guide
their disposition of tax controversies. At the present time, the
final judicial answer is long withheld. In the meantime, there is
much uncertainty, confusion, discrimination, and inconsistency.
The Treasury so far has generally been unable to take a clear and
single position on many questions. Not knowing which way the
courts will eventually come out, it has felt forced to blow both Jlot
and cold on many matters over a period of many years.' This is
the cause of much irritation to taxpayers, of great delay in the disposition of cases, and of many of the difficulties faced both by tax
administrators and by taxpayers and their counsel in dealing with
tax administrators. If there is a way in which the judicial determination of tax cases can be effected more speedily, it should certainly be given careful consideration.
At the present time, most of the tax cases which get into court
start in the Tax Court of the United States. Congress has, of
course, declared that the Tax Court is " an independent agency in
the Executive Branch of the Government." I This is a polite fiction that may once have served a purpose. But the Tax Court is
in organization, tradition, and function a judicial body, and should
be treated as such in any survey of judicial review in tax cases.
Tax cases may also be commenced in any of the ninety odd district
courts of the United States, in the Court of Claims, and, occasignally, in state courts. This diversity of origin would not be a serious matter if the cases.then focussed intd a unified system of review. But appeals from the district courts and the Tax Court lie
to the ten circuit courts of appeals an4 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. The tax decisions of these
courts, and of the Court of Claims, and of state courts are reviewable only by the Supreme Court on certiorari, and that is rarely
obtainable until a conflict of decisions has developed. Thus it is
not enough to litigate a tax question. It must be litigated twice,
SSee, e.g., Note, Finality of Administrative Settlements in Federal Tax Cases
(1944) 57 HARV. L. REV. 912.
SSee Maguire, Federal Revenue - Internal or Infernal? (1943) 21 TA MAG.
77, 8 1-1 2x; M artin, Cost and Efficiency of Tax Ad ministration: Policies (z44
22' TAX MAG. 263, 268.
s INT. REV. CODE §1100.
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or three times, or four times." The question almost always remains an open one until a conflict develops. And the process of
obtaining a conflict often takes an inordinately long time. It is in
any event beyond the control of the ordinary taxpayer, and thus
largely fortuitous in its operation in specific cases. The resulting
uncertainty causes much difficulty and delay in tax administration,
and is the basis of a large part of the dissatisfaction with the present administration of the tax laws. The administrators are themselves hardly to blame for this condition, but it is difficult to make
their predicament understandable to the general public.
Any tax practitioner has frequently had a client come to him
with a recent decision of the Tax Court which he has found in a
service or news letter. The client has been enthusiastic, feeling
that the case, which was decided favorably to the taxpayer,
squarely covers the problem with which he has been confronted.
But the lawyer has to shrug his shoulders. Though the case is well
considered and carefully reasoned, he knows that there are eleven
courts of appeal which review the decisions of the Tax Court.
Even if this case is not appealed, and thus becomes final, another
case involving the same point may come along which will be appealed. But the case is in fact appealed to a circuit court of appeals, and in due time that court affirms the decision of the Tax
Court. Now the client returns with even more enthusiasm. He
feels that he must have something fairly definite and certain by
now. The Tax Court and an important appellate court have both
considered the very question he is interested in, and both have
reached the same result. Besides, the question has been pending
in court for many months. But the lawyer must again shrug his
shoulders. He knows that there is no conflict, and thus small
chance that the Government will even try to take the case to the
Supreme Court. Some other case must start somewhere and work
its way along through the same process until at last a conflicting
6 See Helvering v. Leary, 93 F.(2d) 826 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938); Helvering v.
Schoellkopf, oo F.(2d) 415 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Helvering v. Einhorn, oo F.(2d)
418 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Comm'r v. Kolb, zoo F.(2d) 920 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938);
Comm'r v. Whitaker, 'ox F.(2d) 640 (C. C. A. Ist, 1938); Comm'r v. Food Industries, Inc., ioi F.(2d) 748 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939). All of these six cases taken to five
different circuit courts of appeals involved precisely the same question arising out
of the same reorganization of the General Baking Corporation in 1931. The Government lost in each case.

zz56

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5 7

decision may develop. And then finally the question may go to the
Supreme Court. But when it does go to the Supreme Court, everything is wide open. The prior decisions have only such weight as
the reasoning of their opinions may carry. The Supreme Court
decides it as a brand new question. And until the Supreme Court
has decided it, there is virtually nothing that the taxpayer or his
counsel - or the Government - can rely on. It is curious that
we should still have a system in which the final answers to many
important questions are so long postponed.
What is the effect of this on tax administration? If the Tax
Court decision, or its affirmance by a circuit court of appeals, does
not produce anything upon which the taxpayer or his counsel may
rely, this is equally true of the tax administrator. Suppose a question comes before a tax administrator, and it is pointed out to him
by counsel that two circuit courts of appeals have decided the question against the Government. It is argued to the administrator
that he should therefore not press the point further against the taxpayer with whom he is concerned. The administrator may feel
that the two cases in question are well reasoned, and that the point
should be settled in favor of the taxpayer. Nevertheless, it takes
a large amount of indepenaence and courage on his part to make
such a decision, and very generally he will not feel able to take that
responsibility. For the point is still an open one until the Supreme
Court has spoken. Even though one of the circuit court of appeals
decisions cited to him is by the court in the taxpayer's circuit, it is
not necessarily controlling. For the same question may go up
through another circuit, a conflict may develop, and then the point
will be open in the Supreme Court; and its decision may well
be contrary to the decision of the circuit court of appeals which is
cited to the administrator.
In such a situation, administrators necessarily feel that they
must continue to press points which have been decided against the
Government by the Tax Court or even by several circuit courts of
appeals. And taxpayers and their counsel frequently feel that they
must make a settlement of a point on which they think they are
right, and on which the decisions are in their favor, because they
cannot afford to litigate the question themselves, and the wait for a
Supreme Court decision may be long and hazardous. Like nearly
everything in the tax field, this is a matter which works both ways.

1%
,,iI
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There may be several lower court decisions in favor of the Government on a point, but the administrator will feel that he should compromise the question with the taxpayer, because the taxpayer is
still free to litigate it and seek a conflict, or hold the matter open
until someone else carries through the search for the ultimate
route to the Supreme Court. In this process tens of thousands of
cases must be adjusted in the absence of an authoritative rule, and
the result is expense and discrimination for taxpayers and dissatisfaction for nearly everyone on both sides of the administrative
process.
Numerous examples could be given of the unhappy working out
of this process in actual operation. It is nothing new. One of the
most striking illustrations involved a type of question which normally and naturally arises very frequently in tax administration the situation where a man dies and leaves a trust in favor of his
widow. In such a case, there was room for controversy as to how
the widow should be taxed on the income from the trust. The
Treasury undertook to tax the income to the widow like the income
of any ordinary trust. But it was argued that the widow had
bought her interest in the trust by giving up her right to dower,
and that she should not have any tax to pay until the income payments to her should equal in the aggregate the amount of the dower
which she had given up in order to obtain the benefit of the trust.
This question was first decided by a circuit court of appeals in
Warner v. Walsh.! This case involved the tax years 1917 and
1918. The decision was reached in 1926, and was in favor of the
taxpayer. The Government nevertheless persisted in its efforts to
tax the beneficiary in such cases. It was unsuccessful, however,
in two other circuit courts of appeals.' The Commissioner then
felt that he had tried long enough and that he should not harass
taxpayers further. He therefore issued a ruling to the effect that
the widows should not be taxed in such a case." A natural consequence of this ruling was that the Commissioner should try to tax
zx5 F.(2d) 367 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
8 United States v. Bolster, a6 F.(2d) 76o (C. C. A. Ist, 1928) (involving the tax
years z919 through 1923); Allen v. Brandeis, 29 F.(2d) 363 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928)
(involving the tax years 1920 through 1924).
* I. T. 2480, VIII-2 CUM. BUL. z41 (1929). See also I. T. 2506, VIII-2 CUva
BvLTs.Is9 (1929); G. C. M. 8668, IX-z CUr. BuLL. 93 (1930); G. C. M. 8689, IX--a
CUx,.BuLL. 333 (x93o).
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the income to the trustee. But some trustees resisted and the question as to them wended its way through the courts. It finally got
to the Supreme Court in 1933 in Helvering v. Butterworth.'o The
counsel for the Commissioner there made a curious argument. He
said in effect: " If you won't let us tax the widows, then we think
that you should let us tax the trustee, and we so argue here. But
our real position is that the widows are taxable, and if you agree
with us on that then you should of course decide this case in favor
of the trustee." The Supreme Court did agree, and it was finally
decided that the widows were taxable. This decision came in 1933,
seven years after the question had first been decided by a circuit
court of appeals, and sixteen years after the first of the tax years
involved in that case. In the meantime, there must have been
many thousands of controversies in the Bureau which had to be
argued out and adjusted in one way or another for want of a definite and authoritative rule on what was, after all, a rather typical
and homely sort of point. And the consequences of the confusion
persisted for many years after the question was at last settled.
There was the problem of Stone v. White; " and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had to decide a question in this field
as late as 1941,12 which could have been avoided if the federal tax
question had not been left so long in confusion.
This is one example. It could be illustrated many times again.
The rule as to the deductibility on the cash basis of prepaid insurance premiums has not yet been authoritatively established,
though it has been changed and rechanged to follow conflicting
lower court decisions." But no one even now knows with any cer10 290

U. S. 365 (1933).

11 301 U. S. 532 (937).
Problems of this sort, arising out of the long delays now required before important tax questions can be settled by an authoritative court decision are responsible
for one of the most complex provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. This is § 3801x,
first passed as § 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938. See Maguire, Traynor and Surrey,
Section 820 of the Revenue Act of x938 (1939) 48 YAlz L. J. 509, 719. The necessity for such a section as this under our present system is a strong argument in support of the position here advanced.
12 Blair v. Claffin, 310 Mass. 186, 37 N. E.(2d) Sor (z94i).
1a In Welch v. De Blois, 94 F.(2d) 842 (C. C. A. Ist, 1938), the court held that
such premiums were deductible when paid even though they covered insurance for
more than one year. This was contrary to a prior Bureau ruling in G. C. M. 13148,
XIII-i Cum. Buu,. 67 (1934). A ruling following the De Blois case was then issued
in G. C. M. 20307, 1938-1 Cum. BULL. 157. But when the question came to court
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tainty what is the proper rule on this simple point. Sonleone may
some day get a conflict and take the question to the Supreme Court,
which will be wholly free to decide either way. For a recent striking illustration, consider the famous and unhappy Virginian Hotel
decision." The effect of a lack of " tax benefit " on an excessive
depreciation deduction in prior years had been many times decided
by the Board of Tax Appeals. It must have been an issue before
the Bureau in many thousands of cases. It was first considered
by an appellate court in Pittsburgh Brewing Co. v. Commissioner," and the decision was in favor of the taxpayer. The Government did not apply for certiorari. There was no basis for it in
the absence of a conflict. This decision was repeatedly followed
by the Board."

Four years later the Virginian Hotel case came

along; the necessary conflict had developed," and the Supreme
Court finally decided the question against the taxpayers' contentions. It would be difficult to devise a system which would make
tax administration more difficult and more unsatisfactory.
For a final illustration, let us consider the problem finally decided in Helvering v. Janney." The question was how to compute
the amount of the deduction for charitable contributions on a
joint return of husband and wife - certainly a homely matter,
and one which must have been involved in many thousands of
cases before the administrative authorities. It is also the type of
question on which one rule is about as good as another; the really
important thing is to have a definite answer to the question'19 so
again, Welch v. De Blois was overruled, and the court held that the advance
portion of the premiums could not be deducted. Comm'r v. Boylston Market Ass'n,
131 F.(2d) 966 (C. C. A. ist, 1942). So the second administrative ruling was then
revoked and the first one was reinstated. G. C. M. 23587, 1943-1 CUM. BULL. 213.
But the point must still be regarded as uncertain as the question has not yet been
passed upon by the Supreme Court. See Note, Comm'r v. Boylston Market Ass'n:
Deduction of Fire Insurance Premiums by Taxpayer on the Cash Basis (1943) 56
HARv. L. REv. 818.
14 Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U. S. 523 (1943).

See (1943)

56

HARv. L. REv. II64.
15

07 F.(2d) 155 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).

The tax years involved were 1933 and

1934.

16 The general problem is thoroughly discussed in Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule
Today (1943) 57 HARv. L. REV. 129, 146-49.
17 Helvering v. Virginian Hotel Corp., 132 F.(2d) 909 (C. C. A. 4th, 1943).
U. S. 189 (1940).
1s z311z

19 Cf. Brandeis, J., dissenting, in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S.
393, 405 (1932) ; Lord Cottenham, L. C., in Lozon v. Pryse, 1 My. & Cr. 6oo, 617-
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that it can be quickly resolved in the many cases in which it is
presented to taxpayers and the administrative authorities. The
question first came before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, where the decision went against the taxpayer and
an application for certiorari was denied. 20 Then, in Sweet v. Commissioner,2 1 the taxpayer lost in the First Circuit. He, too, applied
for certiorari - his only recourse - and it was denied.22 Then
the' question came before the Fourth Circuit. It said that it was
" much impressed " by the taxpayer's position, but felt constrained to follow the earlier decisions " in view of the denials of
certiorari by the Supreme Court." 28 After all of this, however,
the magic conflict developed, 2 and the Supreme Court ultimately
resolved the question in favor of the taxpayers. 25 Thus, the prior
taxpayers, who had done everything in their power to obtain a
Supreme Court review, lost their cases, although it was eventually
decided that they had been right all the time. One of these taxpayers sought to get the judgment against him reopened, so that
he might have the result of the Supreme Court decision applied in
his case. But the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
felt -

and rightly under the law - that it must let the prior error
26

A system which allows and requires such results carries
stand.
18, 41 Eng. Rep. 231, 23 7-38 (Ch. 1840); Lord Cranworth, L. J., in Ralston v. Hamilton, 4 Macqueen 397, 4o6, io Scotch Rev. Rep. 542, 546 (H. L. 1862); SALMOND,
JURISPRUDENCE
20

(8th ed. 1930)

42.

Pierce v. Comm'r, Io F.(2d) 397 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); DeMuth v. Comm'r,

oo F.(2d)

(C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert. denied, 307 U. S. 627 (1939)*
zo3 (C. C. A. Ist, 1939).
22 307 U. S. 627 (939).
28 Nelson v. Comm'r, 104 F.(2d) 521 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
The court added
21 102

1012

F.(2d)

that "it is hard to imagine that certiorari would have been denied in a case of this
character unless the Court was satisfied of the correctness of the decision below, particularly as its correctness had been challenged by a dissenting opinion."
24 Janney v. Comm'r, 1o8 F.(2d) 564 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), cert. granted, 310 U. S.
6z7 (1940). Certiorari was also granted shortly thereafter to review the decision in
Gaines v. Helvering, I i F.(2d) 144 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), cert. granted, 311 U. S. 628
(1940). Pure chronological chance thus determined the cases which would be decided by the Supreme Court and the results of the decisions in the cases of particular
taxpayers.
25 Helvering v. Janney, 3z11 U. S.

189

(1940).

"Few tax questions are ever put at rest until they have been interred in the
United States Supreme Court Reports . . . . In the meantime, the issue is usually

obscured by a mass of conflicting decisions." Eichholz, Should the FederalIncome
Tax Be Simplijied? (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1200, 1216.
26 Sweet v. Comm'r, No F.(2d) 77 (C. C. A. Ist, 1941).
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a very heavy burden. If it were inevitable, that would be the end
of it. But it is not a sound system of judicial tax administration.
And it is not inevitable. The reasons for its existence are almost
exclusively historical. It is hard to find much more than inertia
as a reason for its retention.
Many other equally simple, frequently-recurring questions, affecting many taxpayers, could be added to the list. 7 But it is not
necessary to make a list, for there is no question which is not on it;
or has not been on it until the Supreme Court spoke. Those who
say that instances of the sort mentioned are merely unfortunate
accidents in an otherwise sound system 28 are merely shutting their
eyes to the overwhelming glare of the facts. Our present system
of tax adjudication inevitably leaves nearly eVery question uncertain during the entire period while it must be dealt with, usually in thousands of instances, by the administrative officers. And
yet that is just the period when there should be an authoritative rule if the system is to work smoothly, effectively, speedily,
fairly, and without discrimination. Under our present system
delay and discrimination are typical and inevitable.2"
27

In

the Court of Claims decided Steedman v. United States (63 Ct. Cl.
against the taxpayers. This was an estate tax case involving a decedent

1927,

226 (192)),

who died in 1923.

The Supreme Court denied certiorari.

275 U. S. 528 (1927).

Thereafter the requisite conflict developed, and the Supreme Court decided the same
question in favor of the taxpayer.

Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55 (1930).

But

counsel in the Steedman case were more than ordinarily persistent and resourceful.
Many years later they obtained from Congr6ss a special act giving the Court of
Claims jurisdiction to l4ear their case again. Act of April 13, 1940, c. 99, 54 STAT.
1256. The case was duly heard, and the taxpayers obtained judgment. Steedman
Seventeen years were conv. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. 123, 35 F. Supp. 533 (94o).
sumed in the course of this process.
A less happy result was achieved in Art Metal Construction Co. v. United States,
47 F.(2d) 558 (CC. . A. 2d, 931). Decision went against the taxpayer there, and
an application for certiorari was denied. 283 U. S. 863 (1931). Thereafter the
Supreme Court decided the question in favor of other taxpayers, so the taxpayer
started another suit. It lost on the ground of Fes judicata. Art Metal Construction
Co. v. United States, 82 Ct. Cl. 666, 13 F. Supp. 756 (1936). It, too, sought a special act, and got it passed by Congress. 8o CONG. REc. 5916, 5972 (1936). But the
President vetoed the bill. SEN. Doc. No. 205, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); 8o CoNG.
6768-69 (1936). Here again it would seem that the result depended only on
,Rzq.
chance.
28 Cf. Angell, ProceduralReform in the Judicial Review of Controversies under
the InernalRevenue Statutes: An Answer to a Proposal (1939) 34 ILL. L. REv. I151,
153, n.8
29" At the present time, it is impossible to obtain a really authoritative decision
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The point may likewise be illustrated by examining the work of
the Supreme Court for the last complete calendar year. During
1943, the Court decided 21 federal tax cases.8 o Of these, two involved questions of liens for estate taxes. Three involved questions of estate tax liability; one of the decedents died in 1935, and
the two others in 1936. Thus it took from seven to eight years for
an estate tax question to get through the Supreme Court. Two of
the cases involved questions of gift tax liability, the gifts having
been made in 1936 and 1937. It took from six to seven years to get
a gift tax question before the Supreme Court. Of the rest of the
cases, one was criminal." The case came to the Supreme Court because of a conflict with two previous cases decided in 1931 and
1932.82 The earlier of these cases arose out of a tax return which
was filed in 1926. It was seventeen years after that return was
filed before the question at issue was finally passed upon by the Supreme Court. One of the remaining cases involved an excise tax
for the year 1934." It got to the Supreme Court because of a conflict with a decision rendered in 1938, likewise involving the year
1934." The decision of the Supreme Court was contrary to that
reached in the 1938 case. Thus the point was finally put at rest nine
years after the tax was due, and in a way which it may be confidently asserted was contrary to that which had been applied in the
of general application upon important questions of law for many years after the
close of any taxable year. The average period between the taxable year in dispute
and a Supreme Court decision relating thereto is nine years. Meanwhile confusion
reigns in the day-by-day settlement of the more debatable questions of the tax law.
One circuit court holds that a certain situation gives rise to tax liability; another
circuit holds the contrary. The Commissioner and the lower federal courts are both
confronted with the problem of reconciling the irreconcilable. A great part of the
criticism of changing interpretations of the law announced by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue is properly attributable to the multitude of tribunals with original
jurisdiction in tax cases, and to the absence of provision for decisions with nationwide authority in the majority of cases. If we were seeking to secure a state of complete uncertainty in tax jurisprudence, we could hardly do better than to provide
for 87 Courts with original jurisdiction, ii appellate bodies of cordinate rank, and
only a discretionary review of relatively few cases by the Supreme Court." MAGILL,
THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES (1943)

209.

30 These begin with Detroit Bank v. United States, 37 U. S. 329 (943),

and
end with Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U. S. 489 (943).
81 Spies v. United States, 3,7 U. S. 492 (943).
32 O'Brien v.*United States, 51 F.(2d) 193 (C. C. A. 7th, 193:); United States
v. Miro, 6o F.(2d) 58 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).

3- Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. United States, 320 U. S. 422 (943).
34 Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co. v. Rasquin, 95 F.(2d) 438 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
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case of the great majority of the taxpayers who were affected by
the tax.
The remaining twelve cases involved income tax liability for
years from 1935 through 1939. Thus, the elapsed time varied from
four to eight years. But in nearly every case, the question got to
the Supreme Court because of a conflict. The conflicting decision
was rendered as long ago in one case as 1933," and the tax year
involved in that case was 192 I. Thus it was about twenty-two
years'before that particular complexity was resolved. The years
involved in the conflicting decisions in the other income tax cases
ranged from 1929 through 1938. On the whole, it may be said
that in the cases decided by the Supreme Court in the calendar year
1943 it was on the average at least ten years from the time the point
was first raised until it was finally authoritatively determined.
This is not written in criticism of the Supreme Court. No one
who is familiar with the work of that Court could criticize it for
delay. If anything, it may be said that the cases sometimes come
up for hearing there too quickly to give counsel an adequate opportunity to prepare them properly. The difficulty is not with the time
the Supreme Court takes with the cases after they get there, but
with the time it takes to get a question actually before the Supreme
Court. It is true that the Court could help a great deal even under
our present system by making less of a fetish of the conflict test as
a basis for granting certiorari. The Court could exercise a greater
instinct for the vital federal tax quiestions, and grant certiorari the
first time such a question appears." But this would not go to the
.* Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm'r, 39 U. S. 436 (1943), came to the Supreme
Court because of a conflict with 112 West 59th Street Corp. v. Helvering, 62 App.
D. C. 35o, 68 F.(2d) 397 (1933).
36 Thus the Court denied certiorari in Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 F.(2d) 954 (C. C. A.
2d, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 756 (1937). A good deal of confusion would have
been saved if the Court had perceived that this was a question which it was going
to have to decide eventually, and had granted certiorari then instead of waiting for
Estate of Sanford v. Comm'r (3o8 U. S. 39 (939)),

to come along.

Under the present system, however, the Supreme Court may not have the chance
to pass on a question until after long delay. Thus, Hewitt Realty Co. v. Comm'r
(76 F.(2d) 88o (C. C. A. 2d, 1935)), involved an obviously important and frequently recurring question. But the Government did not seek review. It was not
until M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States (305 U. S. 267 (1938)), and Helvering v.
Brunn (309 U. S. 461 (194o)), that the questions came before the Supreme Court.
And these decisions were in time overturned by § ix5 of the Revenue Act of 1942,
adding a new §22(b) (ii)

to the Code.
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heart of the problem. Many of the questions on which authoritative rules are needed are not striking questions. There are more
of such cases than the Supreme Court could handle consistently
with its important duties in other fields of the law. Though the
Supreme Court could undoubtedly help by showing a greater heed
for the administrative consequences of its decisions, the Court cannot under our present system do all that has to be done.
A COURT OF TAx APPEALS

The answer suggested here is to relieve the circuit courts of appeals entirely of their duties in federal tax cases, and transfer them
to a new tribunal which might well be called the Court of Tax Appeals.
This new court should have exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
review all civil decisions in federal tax cases made by any court,
Appeals should lie to it in federal tax cases from the district courts
and from the Tax Court of the United States. It should supersede
the ten circuit courts of appeals and the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in this respect. Appeals should also lie to it
in federal tax cases from the Court of Claims, in order that final
authority in all federal tax matters may be centralized in one tribunal. The judgments of the Court of Claims have heretofore
been subject to review only by the Supreme Court. But much of
the benefit to be derived from centralizing review in tax cases
would be lost if appeals from tax decisions of the Court of Claims
were to follow any different course than appeals from other courts
entrusted with the trial of tax cases.
It would seem desirable, and not at all inconsistent with the basic
purposes of the plan, to leave criminal cases to their present procedural path. They would naturally begin in the district courts,
and appeals should continue to lie to the circuit courts of appeals.
Criminal cases involve more of general law than of tax law anyway,
and our traditional approach to criminal cases requires that they be
handled by the regular courts. They form a part of the regular
stream of criminal cases which properly come before the circuit
courts of appeals. It would be rarely, if ever, that a circuit court
of appeals could consider a tax point in a criminal case which would
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lead it into a conflict with the general civil tax law as developed by
the Court of Tax Appeals.
There would seem to be little room for difficulty in drawing the
line between criminal cases and noncriminal cases in the tax field.
On rare occasions such a question might arise as whether an order
committing a party or his counsel for contempt in a tax case was a
civil or a criminal appeal." But, generally, all cases not originating
by indictment or information would appear to be civil cases. Thus,
a case involving a tax penalty is a civil case." Cases involving forfeitures of property for violations of the tax laws 89 would likewise
be civil cases appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals. Other types
of cases which do not directly involve the determination of tax liability, such as suits to enforce or to enjoin the enforcement of tax
liens," or to quiet title, although somewhat unusual and not directly affecting the general run of tax litigation, are clearly civil
cases. They should be appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals
unless some very difficult lines are to be drawn, and the possibility
of conflict perpetuated.
Review of the occasional federal tax decision made by state
courts presents a minor problem." At the present time, these cases
87

Cf. Ex ParteGrossman, 267 U. S. 87

(1925).

If the line is to be drawn between civil and criminal cases, there should clearly
be a provision in the statute providing for transfer of any appeal taken to the wrong
court. Appellants should not be put to the risk of guessing right on matters of this
sort which bear no relation to the merits of their cases. Cf. Act of September 14,
1922, c.
,305,42
STAT. 837, adding § 238(a) to the Judicial Code, providing for transfer of cases between the Supreme Court and the circuit courts of appeals, where
appeals were taken to the wrong court. This was repealed by the Act of February
13, 1925, c. 229, 43 STAT. 936, 942. See Barr v. McCorkle, 270 U. S. 635 (1926);
FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BusINEss OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927) 283-84.
88 See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391 (1938).
39 Cf. United States v. One 1941 Model Ford Coach, 138 F.(2d) 5o6 (C. C. A.

5th, '943).
Jones v. Tower Production Co., 138 F.(2d) 675 (C. C. A. ioth, 1943).
Federal tax controversies may get into state courts, as an incident of state receivership proceedings (see Conway v. Imperial Life Ins. Co., 198 La. 999, 5 So.(2d)
314 (1941); United States v. Branson, 147 S.W.(2d) 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)), in
the administration of decedents' estates (see Kuhn's Estate, 146 Pa. Super. 1, 2:1
A.(2d) S13 (194x); Matter of Harkavy, 178 Misc. 507, 34 N. Y. Supp.(2d) gro
(Surr. Ct. 1942)), and in cases involving the validity of tax liens (see First National
40 Cf.
41

Bank v. Southland Production Co., 189 Okla. 9, 112 P.(ad) zo87 (x941)), and of

levies of execution for the collection of taxes (see Matter of Rosenberg,
247, z99 N. E. 2o6 (1935)).

~*

269

N. Y.
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follow the normal state procedure, subject only to ultimate review
by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. If all other federal
tax cases, however, are decided by the Court of Tax Appeals it
would be anomalous to have these few cases go directly to the Supreme Court. There would seem to be no reason why state officers
or state courts would be concerned about the type of review when
the question is one of federal taxation. It should be possible, therefore, to have review in these cases, too, by the Court of Tax Appeals. Alternative methods of review might be devised. Ordinarily the federal tax question in such cases would be a " separable
controversy " and provision could be made in the statutes for the
removal of such questions to the appropriate federal district court.
Review then would be directly by the Court of Tax Appeals. Another method would be a provision under which state courts might
certify or refer to the Court of Tax Appeals any federal tax question which arose before the state court. The Court of Tax Appeals
could then render its decision on the question and certify it to the
state court where it would be binding on the federal tax aspects of
the case. 42 This would not in any sense be an advisory opinion,
for it would be an actual decision in an actual controversy presently pending before the court. It should not be too difficult to
work out an appropriate procedure for review of the occasional
federal tax question which gets into a state court. It would be undesirable to ignore these cases on the ground that they are rare and
ordinarily not of great importance, since divergent methods of review in tax cases will inevitably lead to conflict of decisions with
the resulting confusion and uncertainty the elimination of which
is the major purpose of the new system.
REVIEW OF

DECISIONS

OF A COURT OF TAx APPEALS

When a means has been devised to focus all federal tax cases into
the one Court of Tax Appeals, the question still remains as to the
review of the decisions of that court. The decisions of the Court
of Tax Appeals should of course be reviewable by the Supreme
42 The British Law Ascertainment Act, 22 & 23 VIcT. c. 63 (1859), furnishes an
analogy. It was applied in Duncan v. Lawson (41 Ch. D. 394 (1889)), where an
English court certified its opinion on English law for use in a case pending in a

Scottish court. See also Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940).
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Court in all cases involving constitutional questions. The construction and application of the Constitution is the chief of the high
functions of that Court, and it must be the final arbiter of constitutional questions in the tax field as in all other fields of the law.
Whether review of constitutional questions should be by appeal or
on certiorari is a close question. The chief objection to review by
appeal would be the number of frivolous or unsubstantial constitutional questions which might be raised in order to take such cases
to the Supreme Court. But the Court would naturally apply here
the usual requirement that there be a "substantial " question as a
prerequisite to review on appeal." Thus, the jurisdictional statement on appeal could serve much the same function as a petition
for certiorari. Either method of review would seem to be equally
acceptable, although review of constitutional questions by appeal
might get questions before the Supreme Court sooner so that authoritative opinions on constitutional questions in tax cases might
be more promptly available.
Should Supreme Court review likewise extend to questions of
statutory construction and application, and other questions of tax
law? We are accustomed to have all decisions of lower federal
tribunals reviewable by the Supreme Court either by appeal or on
certiorari. But there is no reason why all cases have to be reviewable by the Supreme Court, and there have been long periods in our
history when many decisions were not subject to such review." It
could be argued that the decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals
must be final on all except constitutional questions unless we are to
perpetuate the difficulties which now plague us. If all decisions
of the Court of Tax Appeals should be subject to review by the
Supreme Court on certiorari, then no point decided by the Court of
Tax Appeals would be finally settled and no decision of the Court
of Tax Appeals could be relied on with complete safety. For, even
4

See Rule

316 U. S. 715.

12

of the Rules of the Supreme Court, as amended April 6, 1942,

4 There was no review in the Supreme Court of criminal cases until 1889 except on a certificate of a division of opinion in the circuit court. See FRANKATER
AND LANDIS, THE BusINEss OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927) 79, n.i07; United States
v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 319-22 (1892). In civil cases involving less than $5ooo
there was no review until the enactment of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act in 1891.
See FRNKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREIME COURT (1927)
87-102.
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though certiorari was not applied for in the particular case, or was
applied for and denied, no one could be sure that another case
might not come along in which certiorari would be granted. Whenever the question did get into the Supreme Court, it would still be
wide open. The Court would be free to decide it as it chose; and
its decision might not be in accord with that which had been reached
by the Court of Tax Appeals in the previous case.
On the other hand, it may be argued that the potentiality of review by the Supreme Court is normal, and by now, at least, traditional in our federal judicial system." It furnishes a possible
safety valve, and any effort to establish a Court of Tax Appeals
without the possibility of review by the Supreme Court by certiorari would probably result in substantial opposition. The risk to
the finality of the decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals does not
seem to be important enough to warrant either the break with tradition or the threat of opposition. If a Court of Tax Appeals were
established with review by the Supreme Court on certiorari, it may
be confidently expected that the Supreme Court would undertake
to reexamine very few of its decisions. In the first place, the conflict of decisions which is now the chief basis for getting a case into
the Supreme Court would be almost invariably lacking. In the
second place, the Supreme Court could be counted on to respect the
purpose and function of the Court of Tax Appeals, and to recognize
that its decisions should as a matter of practice be final in all but
exceptional cases. This has been the actual experience with customs cases, which, though now freely reviewable by the Supreme
45The history of the Court of Customs Appeals has shown a progressive elimination of restrictions on review. When that couft was established, its decisions were
made final in all cases, and there was no review by the Supreme Court even on constitutional questions. See 36 STAT. 91, 105 (1909); § 195 of the Judicial Code, 36
STAT. IO87, 1145 (191). This was amended by the Act of August 22, 1914, c. 267,
38s STAT. 703 (1914) to provide for review by the Supreme Court on certiorari of all

cases involving the Constitution or a treaty, and in any other case in which the Attorney General had filed a certificate of importance before the decision of the Court
of rustoms Appeals. The amendment, however, contained a proviso preventing any
review in cases involving only the construction of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of
August 5, 1909, c. 6, 36 STA3.II (1914) or of the Canadian Reciprocal Trade Act
of July 26, 1911, c. 3, 37 STAT. 4.
The restriction on review was wholly removed by § 647 of the Act of June 17,
1930, c. 497, Title IV, 46 STAT. 590, 762, so that review by certiorari became possible
in all cases.
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Court on certiorari, are almost never taken up by that Court except
for the occasional case involving an important constitutional question."
If we had a Court of Tax Appeals it would have in fact substantially final authority on most tax questions, but there is no reason
to think that this would be either unwise or undesirable. The Supreme Court has already gone far to give the lower courts final authority on all questions of fact, and it has made an unfortunate
effort to give the Tax Court final authority on many questions of
law. The Court of Tax Appeals will obviously be a specialized
tribunal. It should develop facility and a consistent approach in
matters of statutory construction and general policy. Very likely
it will make mistakes. That would not be novel. The Supreme
Court has not been unduly felicitous in some of its tax decisions.
Congress has had to change a great many of them by subsequent
legislation." But under our present system, these changes come
very late, after the question involved has been mooted and argued
and litigated through the Treasury and courts in many cases over
a period of years. The resulting corrective legislation by Congress
has often had to be retroactive over a long period, with consequent
discrimination between taxpayers who may or may not be able to
take advantage of the retroactive legislation for one reason or another." If there were a Court of Tax Appeals with practical final
authority in matters of statutory construction and general policy,
the need for legislative action would appear much more promptly
- without the necessity of waiting for a conflicting opinion and an
eventual decision by the Supreme Court.
46 See United States v. George S. Bush & Co., Inc., 310 U. S. 371 (1940); Board

of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U. S. 48 (933); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294 (1933); Hampton &
Co..v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928).
4 See the partial list in Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of
Law and Fact (3944) 57 HARV. L. REV. 753, 76o, n.29. See also Maguire, Federal
Revenue-Internal or Infernal? (1943) 21 TAx MAG. 77, 123.
48 See Merrill v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 674 (W. D. N. Y. 1944), where

the taxpayer was denied a deduction for 1936 under the retroactive application of
1 23(a) (2) of the Code (relating to nontrade and nonbusiness expenses) because he
had litigated the question before the Board of Tax Appeals before the amendment
to the statute was passed. Other taxpayers who had not been involved in the previous litigation would clearly be entitled to the deduction.
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The Dobson Case
Is there any need for such a change in our system of judicial tax
procedure? Has not the Supreme Court already accomplished
much the same result through its decision in the Dobson case? "
The answer to the latter question is clearly and emphatically, No!
The difficulties with the Dobson case in theory and in practice have
already been developed by Mr. Randolph Paul."o No one understands its scope," and there is almost certain to be more litigation
as to the applicability of the Dobson rule than there was as to the
basic tax questions themselves. This sort of litigation about procedure is, futile and fruitless. It results from an effort to import
into the tax field notions of finality which have recently been developed with respect to administrative tribunals. But apart from
the merits of these notions themselves, they have no proper application to the Tax Court. That court is a court in name and in fact,
and in everything else except the letter of the statute and the Committee Reports. It acts judicially, and has a fine record in acting
judicially. It is not a policy formulating and enforcing agency. It
sits impartially between the Commissioner and the taxpayer.
Moreover, and this is most important, the Tax Court of the
United States is in reality sixteen tax courts. In the formulation
of the Dobson rule, it is clear that the Tax Court was thought of as
a unified entity, like the Federal Power Commission, or the Securities and Exchange Commission. But the fact, of course, is that
each judge of the Tax Court ordinarily sits alone to hear a tax
case, and the great majority of cases are not only heard by that
49
(1944).

50

Dobson v. Comm'r,

320 U.

S. 489

(1943),

rehearing denied,

321 U. S. 231

Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact (1944)

57 HARV. L. REV. 753.

51 "Whether the Dobson case was intended to introduce a revolutionary limitation upon the scope of judicial review as previously understood and practiced, or
merely to reemphasize that under the revenue act the decisions of the Tax Court
may be reversed only if 'not in accordance with law' . . . is a question which will
no doubt perplex the circuit courts of appeals until further light is shed upon the
Dobson case by later decisions of the Supreme Court." Magruder, J., in Denholm

& McKay Realty Co. v. Comm'r, 139 F.(2d) 545, 550 (C. C. A. Ist, 1944).

The effect of the Dobson case on the circuit courts of appeals to date can only
be described as chaos. See Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of
Law and Fact (1944) 57 HARv. L. REV. 753, 798-801.

There is no reason to think

that it can ever produce any results more orderly or useful.

*
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judge alone but are decided by him alone. During the calendar
year 1943, the Tax Court decided 804 cases with separate opinions.
Of these, 540 were memorandum decisions by a single judge. The
officially reported decisions in the same year numbered 264. Of
these, 200 were the decision of a single judge, and 64 were reviewed
by the court. Thus, a total of 740 cases were decided by the opinion of a single judge, while 64, or about eight per cent of the whole
number, were reviewed by the court. There is no criticism of the
Tax Court in this. There is a great deal of labor involved in hearing a tax case, formulating findings of fact, and rendering an opinion on the issues involved. The sixteen judges of the Tax Court
could not sit together on all of the cases. But the fact remains that
the great majority of the decisions of the Tax Court are rendered
by a single judge without formal deliberation or consultation.
Even where the decision is reviewed by the court, only one judge
has seen the witnesses and heard the evidence. There is no opportunity for oral argument before the other judges. The adjudication even in such a case is considerably removed from a case which
is argued in open court and heard by all the judges who then participate in the deliberations and the decision.
This difficulty may be heightened by the fact that the Tax
Court may now hear cases through commissioners, 52 so that the
actual basic decision in the case may not even be made by one of
the judges of the Tax Court. It has long been true that Board
members and Tax Court judges have had the assistance of law
clerks, whose views may be of more or less weight in the decision
of cases." It is certainly highly desirable that the Tax Court
should have these aids in the difficult task of trial work in tax cases.
But the fact is emphasized that the Tax Court is to a considerable
extent a collection of individuals and not an integrated, unified
group. It is just the sort of instrument in our procedural system
which, no matter how well its work is done in individual cases, may
benefit from broad appellate review on all questions of law.
The result of this organization of the Tax Court, as every observer of the flow of Tax Court decisions knows, is a great deal of
52

See INT. REv. CODE

§ I1I4(b),

added by

§ 503

of the Revenue Act of 1943.

Cf. Miller, Supporting Personnel of Federal Courts (1943) 29 A. B. A. J. 130,
z31, and the statement of Mr. Justice Jackson that the Tax Court "is relatively
better staffed for its task than is the judiciary." Dobson v. Gomm'r, 320 U. S. 489,
498 (1943).
5
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variation and inconsistency in the decisions of that court. In a
good many cases it may be said, without thought of criticism, but
merely as a statement of fact, that the result in the case depends
in large measure on the particular judge who happened to be assigned to hear the case. This appears to be true, for example, in
many of the efforts by judges of the Tax Court to apply the Clifforod
"rule." But apart from differences of approach in such matters,
it is natural that the judges of the Tax Court should differ among
themselves in the details of the construction and the application
of the tax laws. One judge is not bound by the decision of another
judge unless it has been reviewed by the whole court. Thus, each
judge necessarily and naturally decides the cases which come before him the way he thinks they should be decided. He will of
course try to follow the general body of the tax law. But if he
disagrees with the conclusion reached by one of his fellow judges
in a memorandum decision, he is most likely to ignore the other
case and follow his own view. Memorandum decisions are not
cited by the court in its published opinions, and they are not regarded as having much binding effect under the general rule of'
stare decisis. But they do represent more than two-thirds of the
total number of cases decided by the Tax Court. They represent
the bulk of the decisions to which the Dobson rule applies. Because of the volume of cases to be decided, it is certainly necessary
that most of these cases should be heard and decided by a single
judge. But to give to such decisions the broad finality on many
questions of law as well as of fact which is indicated by the
Dobson case is to multiply diversity and discrimination, and not
at all to aid a group policy-making agency to formulate and carry
out its policies.
Even if the Dobson rule were clear and understandable in its
application, and even if decisions of the Tax Court were always
decisions of all the court, the Dobson rule would not solve the problem with which we are confronted. In the first place, a good many
questions are undoubtedly" unmistakable questions of law "which
are subject to review by the appellate courts. These questions
now fan out from the Tax Court to eleven appellate tribunals, and
we cannot know the answers until the tedious and wasteful process
of conflict and ultimate decision by the Supreme Court has been
carried through. ' Furthermore, although the bulk of the tax cases
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start in the Tax Court, there are a good many which begin in the
district courts and the Court of Claims. No one knows how far the
Dobson rule is to apply to review of the decisions of the district
courts. Apparently, it should not apply at all, since its supposed
rationale is wholly lacking. Thus, even though a question is one
subject to the Dobson rule when it comes through the Tax Court,
it will apparently be wide open in the circuit courts of appeals when
it comes there through the district courts, and it will certainly be
wide open in the Court of Claims. Thus, confusion and diversity
are perpetuated. It will not do to say that circuit courts of appeals
should in such cases defer to the opinions rendered by the Tax
Court in other cases involving the same point. The point may not
yet have been decided by the Tax Court. And again we should not
forget that there are for this purpose in reality sixteen tax courts
as a practical matter.
The only way to have a sensible system of court review of tax
cases is to have a unified appellate procedure in all cases through a
single Court of Tax Appeals. The Dobson case was formulated out
of a desire to reduce the present confusion." The desire was wellfounded. But the Supreme Court is not the legislature. It does
not have the means to deal with the whole problem comprehensively. The Dobson case was probably more than it should have
undertaken along this line. In any event, it will not solve the
problem, and will apparently aggravate it. But Congress does
have the power to deal with the question. The lengths to which
the Supreme Court has gone in the Dobson case emphatically
point out the need for action. Congress can deal with the problem
comprehensively and effectively, and it rather than the Supreme
Court is the appropriate agency to revise the procedural system
in tax cases.
5As Mr. Paul has pointed out (Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange
Ways of Law and Fact (1944) 57 HARv. L. REv. 753, 76o), it is easy to trace Mr.
Justice Jackson's opinion in the Dobson case back to the ideas he expressed as Assistant General Counsel for the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in Jackson, Equity in
the Administration of Federal Taxes (935) 13 TAx MAG. 641. Perhaps the first
expression of the thesis of the present article is found in the following passage:
"We are getting too much law, and too many kinds of law, and from too many
sources, for tax administration to be simple, or the law clear. Should we reserve to
the Supreme Court only constitutional questions in tax matters? Should matters of
statutory construction be settled by a tax court, instead of by the twelve Circuit
Courts of Appeals, with their frequent conflict of viewpoint? " 13 TAx MAG. at 686.
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THE ANALOGY TO THE COURT OF CUSTOMS APPEALS

The creation of a single Court of Tax Appeals finds an interesting analogy in another closely related field of the law. There were
many years in our history when customs duties provided the bulk
of federal revenues. As recently as 1910, nearly half of the government's tax receipts came from taxes on imports." It was natural that these taxes should give rise to controversies, and the history of the handling of these controversies is remarkably similar to
that which we have experienced to date in the internal revenue
field. 56 The original method for contesting the validity of a customs exaction was a common-law suit against the collector of customs; "I and this in 1864 became a statutory suit against the collector." In the internal revenue field the corresponding suit
against the collector still survives, and until comparatively recent
times was the only remedy available to the taxpayer.
In 1890, the Board of General Appraisers was established in the
customs field." This was clearly an administrative tribunal at the
time it was set up. Its decisions were reviewable by the circuit
court for the district where the transaction arose, with further review by the circuit courts of appeals and by the Supreme Court.
Where the Board of General Appraisers had jurisdiction, the old
remedy against the collector of customs was superseded.6 0 Thus
the only remedy was an appeal to the Board, with a further appeal
to the circuit court, and on to the circuit court of appeals, with
5s Customs duties for 19o amounted to $333,683,445, while total ordinary receipts of the government were $675,511,715. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY
OF THE TREASURY (1943) 468.

For the history of the procedure used in customs cases, see FUTRELL, THE HisCUSTOMS JURISPRUDENCE (1941); Brown, The United States
Customs Court (933) 19 A. B. A. J. 333, 416; Brown, Judicial Review in Customs
Taxation (1933) 26 LAWYER & BANKER & CENTRAL L. J. 263. See also Bland, The
Work of the United States Customs Courts (1930) 81 TARIFF REv. 12.
5 See Elliott v. Swartwout, io Pet. 137 (U. S. 1836); Bend v. Hoyt, 13 Pet. 263
56

TORY OF AMERICAN

(U. S. 1839). See also Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236 (U. S. 1845), and the Act of Feb.
26, 1845, c. 22, 5 STAT. 727, restoring the right to sue the collector.
58 Act of June 30, 1864, c. IM1, § 14, 13 STAT. 202, 214, which became REV. STAT.
§ 2931 (1874). See Arnson v. Murphy, 109 U. S. 238 (1883).
59 Act of June io,1890, c.407, 26 STAT. 131.
60 Schoenfeld v. Hendricks, 152 U. S. 691 (1894). But the'right to sue the col-

lector persisted in cases where the Board had no jurisdiction, as where the contention
was that no importation had been made. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. I (19o1).
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possible review by the Supreme Court. This system was followed
for the next nineteen years. At first it seemed to work very well,
but in the course of time it gave rise to difficulties which are remarkably similar to those we now face in the internal revenue field.
" Resort to the administrative method brought, not relief through
economical and expert disposition of technical litigation, but new
delays, waste, and confusion. Under this system four and a half
years were consumed while litigation travelled at a snail's pace
towards a final decision." 61 The Secretary of the Treasury complained in 1908 that " each of at least 120 judges [was] a possible
final judge of customs appeals." 62 Investigation by the Senate
Finance Committee disclosed " fatal delays " and " costly conflicts
in the decisions of the circuit courts of appeals. The fiscal system
of the Government was seriously affected by ill-adapted legal machinery." 63
The result was that Congress in 1909 established a single court
to review all customs cases, the Court of Customs Appeals.64 And
from that time on there has never been any problem or difficulty
with respect to customs litigation. A customs case almost never
goes to the Supreme Court. The single court of review handles all
cases expeditiously and effectively. It seems entirely safe to say
that there is no body of complaint as to the handling of customs
cases, and'has never been since the establishment of the single court
of review more than thirty-five years ago.
In the interval, the Board of General Appraisers has metamorphosed into the Customs Court,65 just as the Board of Tax Appeals
has become the Tax Court of the United States.66 And the Court
of Customs Appeals has become the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals,6 7 since the volume of work arising made it possible to combine both types of work in the same court.
61 FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927)
62 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (I9o8) 58.

99.

ISo.

63 FRANKFURTER AND LANDIs, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927)
64 36 STAT. II, 105 (1909), 28 U. S. C. §301 (940).
See Judicial Code §§

188-

44STAT. 669 (1926), z9 U. S. C. § 15x8 (1940).
66 Section So4 of the Revenue Act of 1942, amending, INT. REV. CODE §

1100.

151.

65

The language of this statute was obviously modelled after the one cited in the preceding note which changed the name of the Board of General Appraisers to the
United States Customs Court.
7 45 STAT. 1475 (1929),

28 U. S. C. § 301 (1940).
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Here is an almost forgotten bit of history which it seems pertinent to reexamine in the present connection. The fact that it
is so nearly forgotten is something of a demonstration of how effectively our machinery for handling customs litigation has worked.
It is true that customs litigation is not wholly comparable to internal revenue litigation. The latter has become far more vast in
volume and probably more difficult in complexity. But that simply emphasizes the desirability of coordinating review in internal
revenue cases. The analogy between the two fields is a close one,
and the results in the ciistoms field are very striking and encouraging."
THE WORK OF A

COURT OF TAx APPEALS

Certain practical considerations must be examined. Are there
not so many appeals in tax cases that a single court would be
swamped if it alone had to hear all of them? Would this not result
in delays which would cause greater confusion and more denial of
justice than under the present system? Would there be any work
left for the regular circuit courts of appeals if all of the tax cases
were taken away from them? These are pertinent questions and
the answers to some of them are by no means easy. Nevertheless,
it does not appear that these practical difficulties are insuperable.
The accompanying table illustrates the volume of work performed by the various federal appellate courts during the calendar
year 1943. It has been made by paging the volumes of the Federal
68 "Many misgivings were expressed and many dark prophecies were indulged
as to the future of such a specialized jurisdiction. The necessity for such action was
great. District Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeal [s] differed widely on the interpretation of the law, and there were almost tas many views of the law as there
were courts. The Supreme Court, with an overcrowded docket, was called upon
frequently to determine which of the lower courts was right. Long delaysand expensive litigation worried the Government and harassed the importer. . . . Confronted with these conditions, which, owing to the steadily growingvolume of
business, were becoming each day more alarming, Congress created the Court of
Customs Appeals and all intermediate appellate steps were done away with."
"I believe I can say that the hope of the framers of the law creating the present
judicial system in customs matters has been fully realized. It has been realized in
speedy and less expensive adjudication of customs questions and in the uniformity
of decisions, all of which has resulted in stimulating commerce, in giving confidence
to concerned business investment, has relieved the tax payer, made more certain the
revenue in the Government Treasury and simplified the task of the customs lawyer."
Bland, The Work of the United States Customs Courts (1930) 81 TARnrr REV. 12, 32.
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Reporter covering this period. It includes all cases decided in 3943
regardless of when they may have been filed or argued. The figures are given by opinions rather than by cases, so that if several
cases or docket numbers were decided in one opinion, it appears
as one case in the table. Presumably most of the full opinions of
these courts are recorded in the Federal Reporter, so that the table
in this respect should be approximately accurate. There is certainly great variation in the reporting of memorandum decisions.
In some of the circuits, notably the Eighth and the Tenth, every
case disposed of on stipulation of counsel following a settlement is
reported in a memorandum. In other circuits, notably the Second
and the Sixth, a good many cases which were fully briefed and
argued, many of which required time for consideration, are decided
in memorandum decisions. Thus the memoranda cannot be ignored. They have been listed in the table just as they appear in
the Federal Reporter. Because of the different practices of the
several courts, however, the figures as to memoranda are not particularly indicative. On the average, the memorandum decisions
appear to amount to about fifteen per cent of the total. As a number of these required no action by the court, but were entered
merely on stipulation of the parties, it would seem to be adequate to
say that the considered memorandum decisions amount to about
ten per cent of the published opinions. With this probable adjustment in mind, we can give consideration to the figures for full
opinions.
During the year 1943, the ten circuit courts of appeals and the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided 1763 cases
by opinion. Of these, 309 were federal tax cases, leaving 1454 nontax cases decided by these courts. Thus the proportion of federal
tax cases in the circuit courts of appeals was about seventeen and
one-half per cent of the total."
One fairly safe conclusion may be drawn from these figures. Removing jurisdiction over federal tax cases from the circuit courts
of appeals would not leave these courts with nothing to do. They
would still have about eighty per cent of their present volume of
69 The proportion varies from 10.4% of tax cases in the Tenth Circuit to 26.4%
in the Third Circuit. The Sixth Circuit also runs high with 25.6%, and the Ninth
Circuit with 22.5%. In the Fifth Circuit the percentage was 20.8%, and in all of
the other courts it was less than 20%.
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work, including Labor Board cases, Wage and Hour cases, Securities and Exchange Commission cases, Federal Trade Commission
cases, Federal Power Commission cases, Federal Communications
Commission cases, milk cases, patent cases, bankruptcy cases, diversity cases, and so on. Many of these fields are expanding, and
several of the circuit courts of appeals are already crowded and
delayed in their work. So far as the circuit courts of appeals are
concerned, therefore, the elimination of tax cases would seem to be
a distinct contribution to the efficient working of our federal judicial system.
What is the situation when we look at it from the other point of
view, that is, when we consider the volume of work which would
have to be handled by a single court of tax appeals? During the
year 1943, the circuit courts of appeals issued 309 opinions in tax
cases." Could one court handle this volume of work? There is
certainly a difficulty here which must be frankly faced. But it
does not seem to be insuperable. During the three terms 1940,
1941, and 1942, the Supreme Court's average disposition of appellate cases on the merits was 309 cases. In addition, the Supreme
Court disposed of an average of four original cases on the merits
each term. 1 These figures are not strictly comparable, because
those

for

the

Supreme

Court

are

based

on

docket

numbers,

and

include dispositions by memoranda as well as by full opinions.
But the Supreme Court also disposed of an average of 736 petitions
for certiorari during these three terms, and it is well known that the
consideration of these petitions is a very time-consuming task.
Moreover, the average difficulty and importance of cases before
the Supreme Court is probably considerably greater than that of
the run of tax cases. The opinions of the Supreme Court are probably longer and more difficult to prepare than those which would
be required for the disposition of tax cases on the average; and they
more frequently invoke extended dissents which must require as
much time and care in writing as the opinions of the Court.
Besides the Supreme Court, reference may be made to the fact
that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with
70 In addition, the Court of Claims decided 21 taX cases, some of which might
have been appealed if review lay from thq Court of Claims to a single court of tax
appeals.
71 See table, at 32o U. S. 217 (1943).
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six judges, wrote 266 opinions in 1943, the Fifth Circuit, with five
judges, wrote 235 opinions, while the Seventh Circuit, with five
judges, wrote 200 opinions. Similar figures might be compiled for
state courts, and it would be found that many of them dispose of
more than 300 cases per year. The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, with five judges, wrote opinions in 155 cases in the year
ending April i, I943. And it should not be forgotten that the sixteen judges of the Tax Court produced 804 decisions in 1943, with
all the labor of hearing the trials of cases and the often difficult
task of preparing findings of fact.
Thus, it does not seem at all impossible that a Court of Tax Appeals made up of, say, nine judges could handle effectively the
volume of appellate tax work which was handled in 1943 by the
circuit courts of appeals. But there is another factor of great importance. The establishment of a single Court of Tax Appeals
would almost certainly result in a substantial decline in the number
of tax cases appealed beyond the trial court. In the first place, it
would no longer be necessary to appeal a number of cases in order
to obtain a conflict, as under the present system. Many of the
cases presented to the several circuit courts of appeals now involve
identical or substantially similar issues. Each such case now requires full dress consideration by the circuit court of appeals to
which it is appealed. If there were a single court of tax appeals,
only one such case would have to be appealed. The decision in
that case would establish the law, binding on both the Government
and the taxpayers. If another such case should be appealed, it
could be summarily disposed of.
Moreover, with the prompter settling of the tax law through the
decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals there would be far fewer
controversies taken from the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the
trial courts. With fewer cases in the trial courts, there would be
fewer appeals. Thus, it seems clear that once the Court of Tax
Appeals was established and in full operation the volume of tax
appeals would decline to an amount which could be readily handled
by a court of perhaps seven and certainly of nine judges. This
would not seem to be an inappropriate number of judges to have
to make final decisions on all matters of federal taxation, except
those involving a question of codstitutional law.
There is a further difficulty which must be considered, and one
'1
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by no means easily solved. Under the present system, a taxpayer
may have his tax appeal considered by a court which sits fairly
near his home. If his case gets to the Supreme Court, he has to go
to Washington; but the first and usually final appeal is heard by a
circuit court of appeals in his own locality. Often, even this involves a considerable amount of travel. It is over a thousand miles,
for example, from Montana to a session of the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco; and it may be the
best part of a thousand miles for a taxpayer in the northern peninsula of Michigan to attend the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit at Cincinnati. But in either case the distance is less
than if he had to go to Washington. It seems wholly clear, therefore, that the Court of Tax Appeals would have to be a circuit
court in the true sense. It might have its headquarters in Washington, or perhaps New York, or elsewhere, but it would have to
arrange for frequent sittings in a number of cities throughout the
country. Such a program involves difficulties, including physical
difficulties for the judges, but it is certainly feasible and possible.
It is the plan now followed by the Tax Court, the judges of which
hold hearings throughout the country. It is also the plan followed
by the Emergency Court of Appeals, created under the Price Control Act of 1942.72

In order to insure flexibility, the present provisions in the Judicial Code for transferring judges by designation should be made
applicable to the Court of Tax Appeals. Thus, in case the Court
of Tax Appeals met an unusual volume of work, or if some of its
judges should be disqualified for one reason or another, the Chief
Justice should have power to designate other federal judges to sit
on the court from time to time. And, similarly, judges of the Court
72 56 STAT. 3z (1942), 5o U. S. C. § 924(c) (Supp. 1943).
It might be that a satisfactory system could be worked out under which hearings
would be held in particular cases by somewhat less than the full number of the
judges of the court. This is the practice in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, for example. That court consists of seven justices, but it is the usual custom for only five to sit in any case. It would be of the greatest importance, however,
not to have the Court of Tax Appeals divide into permanently separate divisions.
This would go far to negative the finality which is one of the principal reasons for
establishing such a court. If a practice should be established under which decisions
would be rendered by less than the full membership of the court, such cases must
be regarded as binding in subsequent cases before the court to the full extent of stare
decisis.
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of Tax Appeals should be available for designation to the circuit
courts of appeals or the district courts as occasion should arise.
Ordinarily, it would be expected that few such designations would
be made, just as few are made now.73 But the power to make them
would be an important means of meeting many possible difficulties
which might arise.
A Constitutional Court
The Court of Tax Appeals would be one of our most important
tribunals, and it should be clearly established as a constitutional
court, with the full power and authority at law and in equity of the
present circuit courts of appeals. Its judges should have life
tenure, and the full privileges of constitutional federal judges, including freedom from diminution of compensation, and pensions
on retirement. It would be hoped that Presidents would see the
great public importance of nominating able men for places on such
a court, and that it would not become a haven for lame ducks or
political misfits. The statute creating the Customs Court provides
that not more than five out of the nine judges shall be of the same
political party. 7' The customs "fieldprobably is, or was, more involved in partisan politics than that of internal revenue.7 ' There
would not seem to be any sound political reason for making a similar requirement with respect to the Court of Tax Appeals."
Whether such a requirement would help to insure appointments
to the court on the merits of the appointees, rather than for political reasons, is so doubtful that it would probably be wiser to omit
it altogether, and to hope that the court itself would build up such
prestige through its important place in the federal judicial system
that Presidents would use the utmost care in making appointments
to it. Some of the original appointments might well be made from
7

See

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TH

8.
737 (1930), 19 U. S. C. § 15i8 (1940).
" ". . . the evidence of taxpayer representatives and of observation indicates
overwhelmingly that partisanship does not materially influence federal tax adminisJ
tration." Martin, Cost and Efficiency of Tax Administration: Policies (944) 22
UNITED STATES COURTS (1943)
74 46 STAT.

TAX MAG. 263.

76 There is no such provision with respect to the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals. A justice of that court has referred to it as "non-partisan," and felt that
the bi-partisan provision as to the Customs Court was unwise and unnecessary.
Bland, The Work of the United States Customs Courts (930)

81 TARIFF REV. 12, 32.
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present federal circuit and district judges who have demonstrated
their capacity in federal tax matters.
The Argument about Specialization
This suggests an objection which may be voiced to the whole
plan of a single Court of Tax Appeals. Will the judges not become
so specialized and technical that tax decisions will soon become
artificial and refined, losing all touch with the general law and
with the common law? This is a difficulty which is easy to exaggerate unduly. The judges of the Court of Tax Appeals will presumably be lawyers, and lawyers have a common background and
tradition. This may not be the background and tradition of the
general public, but at least it is not a different background and tradition in a lawyer who is appointed to the Court of Tax Appeals
than in a lawyer who becomes a judge of a circuit court of appeals.
Some lawyers are narrow on circuit courts of appeals, or even the
Supreme Court, and some may be narrow on the Court of Tax Appeals. The remedy is to use care to appoint men of broad training
and outlook, men who will see tax problems in their setting in the
general economic and political and social picture. If the judges
on the Court of Tax Appeals should nevertheless err, their decisions can be corrected by Congress, which is as nearly in touch with
the people as any agency of government we have. The Congress
has had to correct a good many decisions in recent years under our
present system. There may even be reason to expect that fewer
legislative changes would be required if the basic decisions in tax
cases were made by a Court of Tax Appeals whose exclusive function it was to establish a consistent and coherent body of judicial
precedent in tax cases.
Moreover, this argument represents a complete misconception
of the tax field. It is high time that tax lawyers rise up to defend
themselves against the charge that tax work is narrowing and
stifling. On the contrary, it seems difficult to find a field which
leads practitioners more widely through the whole fabric of the
law. A tort lawyer is a tort lawyer, and a corporation lawyer is a
corporation lawyer. But a tax lawyer must deal constantly not
only with statutes and committee reports and regulations, but also
with questions of property, contracts, agency, partnerships, corpo-
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rations, equity, trusts, insurance, procedure, accounting, economics, ethics, philosophy. He must be broad in his background and
broad in his outlook, if he is,to deal effectively with the manifold
problems which make up the modern field of tax law. There is no
reason to expect that a judge in this field should become narrow
and technical and specialized. Tax lawyers who express such a
fear do not do justice to the intellectual potentialities of their
chosen field.
THE TRAYNOR PLAN

One who has read this far will undoubtedly recall the recominendations made six years ago by Professor Traynor (now Mr. Justice
Traynor of the Supreme Court of California), and that a proposal
for a single court of tax appeals was an element in the so-called
Traynor Plan." That proposal was epgulfed in opposition,7 ' and
it may seem bold to re-advance a portion of it now. But there are
and so
significant differences, and those differences
nt as to warrant thoughtful consideration for the
cl
present proposal on its merits.
i. In the Traynor Plan the recommendation for a single court
77

Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate,

and Gift Taxes -A Criticism and a Proposal (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 1393, 1427-31.
78 The principal discussions in opposition to the Traynor Plan were: Prettyman,
The Traynor Proposals- Some Considerations (1939) 17 TAx MAG. 397, also ap-

pearing as, Prettyman, A Comment on the Traynor Plan for Revision of Federal Tax
Procedure (1939) 27 GEO. L. J. ro38; Angell, ProceduralReform in the JudicialReview of Controversies under the Internal Revenue Statutes: An Answer to a Proposal (1939) 34 ILL. L. REv. ISi; Youngquist, Proposed Radical Changes in the
Federal Tax Machinery (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 291; Seidman, Proposed Procedural
Changes in Federal Tax Practice (1939) 67 J. AcCOUNTANCY 22 1; Sutherland,
New Roads to the Settlement of Tax Controversies: A Critical Comment (194o)
7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 359; Pearce, Trends In Federal Tax Procedure (1940) 69
J. ACCOUNTANCY 369. The Traynor Plan was also condemned in the report of
a special committee of the Tax Section of the American Bar Association published
in AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, PROGRAM AND COMMITTEE REPORTS OF THE SECTION
OF TAXATION (1940) 64.
The Traynor Plan was defended in: Surrey, The Traynor Plan-What It Is
(1939) z7 TAx MAG. 393; Surrey, Some Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administration (1940) 25 WASH. U. L. Q. 399; Traynor and Surrey, New Roads Toward the Settlement of Federallncome, Estate, and Gift Tax Controversies (194o)

7 LAW & CONTEMP.

PROB.

336.

Cf. Maguire, Federal Revenue - Internal or Infernal? (94%) 21 TAx MAG. 77
122: " The so-called ' Traynor Plan ' for reshaping the frame of Federal tax litigation met a blast of criticism which bore more heat than light."
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of tax appeals was only one element in a much larger scheme. The
plan also called for a reorganization of procedure within the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the basic purpose of which was to give
the Bureau's determinations administrative finality and to eliminate any trial de novo before an independent tribunal. That was
an unsound recommendation and was alone enough to warrant the
defeat of the Traynor Plan. This is no criticism of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, but merely a recognition of the vastness of the
administrative job that has to be done and of the fact that it must
be done by thousands of persons without the possibility of control
or decision in each case by the central agency, as is the case with
other agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, or
the Federal Power Commission, or even the National Labor Relations Board. Moreover, this proposal would have completely
changed the handling of cases within the Bureau. It would have
formalized the procedure and made largely impossible the conferences and adjustments which are an essential part of administering
a system which affects millions of taxpayers.
No such recommendation is included in the present proposal. It
does not clearly appear that any essential changes in the present
procedure of the Bureau are either necessary or desirable. The
recent decentralization of the Bureau, and grant of power to the
field offices, particularly of the Technical Staff, have gone far to
make the Bureau an effective agency in tax administration. Apart
from normal evolution in this procedure, the Bureau's major problem would seem to be to maintain the personnel of high quality essential to the effective operation of any administrative system.
But one of the healthy factors in the Bureau's administration is
the fact that both parties know that the next step beyond the Bureau is an unrestricted review of the case by a wholly independent
tribunal. No recommendation for a change in that arrangement
is made here.
2. Under the Traynor proposal, jurisdiction in tax cases was to
be taken away from the district courts and the Court of Claims.
All tax cases would be heard by the Board of Tax Appeals, now the
Tax Court. This proposal was assailed on two grounds: (a) It
deprived the taxpayer of the right to a trial in his own community;
and (b) it deprived the taxpayer of any right to trial by jury. The
present recommendation suggests no change in the jurisdiction of
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the district courts or of the Court of Claims. Taxpayers will still
be able to bring their tax cases in their local district courts to the
same extent as at the present. In some ways it may seem anomalous to maintain this remedy, and it is not availed of by taxpayers
very often. But whether otherwise sound or not, it is regarded as
a matter of importance by some taxpayers and their counsel, and
it may fairly and properly be retained as an important safety valve
in the tax system. It not only preserves the right to trial by jury,
but also answers a difficulty which may be felt by some taxpayers
or their counsel that the Tax Court of the United States is too close
to or too greatly influenced by the Treasury. The establishment of
a system of review by a single court of tax appeals need not affect
our procedure as to the nisi prius trial of tax cases in any respect,
and all remedies, and all forms of trial in a local tribunal, may be
fully maintained. This should answer a very considerable part of
the opposition which was directed against the Traynor Plan."
3. Closely related is the fact that under the Traynor Plan there
would be no remedy available to taxpayers in a constitutional court.
The distinction between " constitutional " and " legislative " courts
is rather esoteric, 80 and the court proposed in the Traynor Plan
might well have been a constitutional court." But it is clear that
the court here recommended will be and will have to be a constitutional court, for it will have jurisdiction to review the decisions of
the district courts. As these are clearly constitutional courts, it
would certainly be fitting and probably necessary that the court
with jurisdiction to review their decisions should likewise be a constitutional court. The Court of Tax Appeals here recommended is
to be a constitutional court with all the status and authority that
inheres in such a tribunal. This, too, should go far to answer criticisms which were made against the Traynor Plan.
4. It may be thought that Professor Traynor failed to appreciate
the dignity and importance of tax appeals in our judicial and legal
79 It is high time, however, that the Tax Court be given jurisdiction over claims
for refund, and that a procedure be developed under which the taxpayer can pay
the tax asserted to be due in a deficiency letter but nevertheless take the case directly to the Tax Court for review. These procedures, however, would be optional,
preserving in all cases the right to sue in the district court or the Court of Claims.

80 Cf. Katz, Federal Legislative Courts (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 894.

81 See Traynor and Surrey, New Roads Toward the Settlement of Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Tax Controversies (940) 7 LAW &CONTEMP. PROB. 336, 35z.
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system. His single court of tax appeals was an indefinite sort of
stepchild, and he thought it might well be that the tax appellate
work should be handled more or less incidentally by the Court of
Claims or by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia."
And it was suggested by one of Professor Traynor's supporters
that tax appeals should be heard by the general administrative
court which was to be established under the then pending LoganWalter Bill." It was understandable that this throwing of tax
cases into the general hopper along with all the miscellany of administrative law - with which tax law really has almost no relation
- should be anathema to tax lawyers.
The present proposal calls for the establishment of a wholly independent court of all the dignity and importance of the present
circuit courts of appeals. It could easily become one of the strongest and most influential courts in the country. It would recognize
the importance of tax appeals rather than l6se them in the general shuffle of miscellaneous administrative law.
5. The Traynor Plan called for a single court of tax appeals
which would sit only in Washington. It is understandable that
there should be objections to such an arrangement. The present
recommendation seeks to establish a court which need not have its
headquarters in Washington," and which, in any event, will hold
regular sessions at several convenient geographical places in the
country. There are admittedly difficulties in carrying out this part
of the recommendation. But it is important that it be carried
out. A completely centralized court of tax appeals would meet
opposition, and that opposition would be legitimate. The present
proposal, therefore, specifically contemplates a court which will go
regularly on circuit, so that taxpayers will not need, on the whole,
to go further for the presentation of their tax appeals than is necessary under the present system of appeals to the various circuit
courts of appeals.
See Traynor, Administrative and JudicialProcedure for Federal Income, Estate, and Gift. Taxes - A Criticism and a Proposal (938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1393,
82

1430-31.
83 See

Surrey, The Traynor Plan- What It Is (1939) z17TAX MAG. 393, 396.
84 The court might well have its principal offices in New York, or Cincinnati, or

Chicago, or some other convenient city. The headquarters of the Customs Court is
in New York. The Emergency Court of Appeals has sat in many cities throughout
the country. See note 72 supra.
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6. Another difference between the present proposal and the
Traynor Plan merits mention. The Traynor Plan called for a
decentralization of the Board of Tax Appeals (now the Tax Court),
with its separation into five divisions sitting in different parts of
the country. The opponents of the Traynor Plan disclosed the essential nature of their position when they objected to this decentralization of the Board while at the same time objecting to the centralization of court review of Board decisions. J'y suis, j'y reste.
It is not difficult to agree, however, with the part of the argument
which said that there was not enough merit in a plan for formal
decentralization of the Tax Court to make it desirable to adopt
such a change. The Tax Court now holds hearings throughout the
country, so that the geographical needs of the taxpayers are met.
And although there is considerable diversity in the decisions by its
various judges, there is not that sharp and territorial conflict which
would necessarily arise if the Tax Court sat in separate geographical divisions. Accordingly, the present proposal includes no recommendation for any change in the procedure or organization of the
Tax Court."
Local Law

Two further objections were made to the proposal for a single
court of tax appeals in the Traynor Plan which should be mentioned here. Some of the opponents argued that tax questions so
often involve matters of local law that tax appeals should be heard
by local courts which would be familiar with the intricacies of that
law. It is difficult to think that this argument was not overemphasized. In the first place, the proportion of tax cases actually involving questions of purely local law is very small. It was estimated at the time that perhaps ten per cent of the tax cases turn
on questions of local law. But in many of the cases the question
of local law is neither unusual nor difficult. Thus there is only a
85 The recommendation of the Traynor Plan that deficiency notices should be
made more definite and specific (see Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure
for Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes - A Criticism and a Proposal (1938) 38
COL. L. REV. 1393, 1415) should meet with taxpayer approval, and might well be
adopted now by administrative action. Some limits should also be imposed on the
present rule (see INT. REV. CODE §§ 272(e), 87l(e), and 1012(e)) under which the
Commissioner has an unlimited time to assert additional deficiencies as long as a
case is pending before the Tax Court.
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very small proportion of the cases which really involve a question
upon which the special skill of a local court would be necessary or desirable. In the second place, the great majority of the
tax cases are now heard by the Tax Court, which has no special
competency in matters of local law. And finally, there is a very
large measure-of illusion in the notion that the circuit courts of appeals to which cases are now appealed have any special skill in
local law. It would be extremely difficult for example to show any
reason why the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
should be especially qualified in the law of Montana, or that the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was especially talented in the law of Maine. It may be, in a particular case, that
one, or possibly two, of the judges of a circuit court of appeals will
have practiced in a state whose law comes before him. But it
would be largely a matter of chance that his practice would have
taken him into the details of the field which is actually involved in
a particular case. And even if he were especially skilled, he would
only be one of the judges of a bench of at least three.
After all, tax cases like other cases are heard upon brief and oral
argument. If a question of local law is involved, it will be discussed and argued in detail by counsel, and the decision of such
questions on such arguments is the sort of thing which judges are
called upon to do and are ordinarily skilled in doing. With the
exception of Louisiana, we all follow the same legal system. The
importance of the peculiarities of local law can easily be overemphasized on a question such as this. The proposed Court of Tax
Appeals would naturally have a geographical spread in its membership, and would seem to be as well qualified to handle questions
of local law as the Supreme Court is today. It would be hard to
show that the latter court had failed conspicuously in matters of
local law in the many tax cases which have come before it. It
seems equally unnecessary to fear disaster on this point from a
Court of Tax Appeals.
Finally, it may be said that for the few questions of peculiarly
local law which will arise in tax cases, we should have available a
better procedure for having them determined by persons locally
skilled than the completely hit or miss means which is available
through appeals to the circuit court of appeals. There should be
established in connection with the trial procedure in the Tax Court
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and in the district courts a regular method for the reference of
questions of local law to the appropriate local tribunal." In this
way questions of state law could be determined by the state courts
themselves. These determinations would be controlling on all
courts dealing with federal tax questions. This would seem to
be the real answer to the problem of local law in federal taxation.
The use of the local law argument to oppose the creation of a Court
of Tax Appeals seems on the whole essentially hollow.

The Argument for the Status Quo
The 'other argument which was made against the prbposal for a
single court of tax appeals in the Traynor Plan reduces to little
more than the argument whioh must be met by all attempts to
achieve change or progress in any legal field. It was argued rather
vigorously that the present system of delays and conflicts was not
necessarily undesirable. Thus, it was argued that " If the truly
right answer is the ultimate goal of all concerned, a second' con-i
sideration by a second tribunal often corrects an initial error." 8
And in a similar vein it was contended that " The delay resulting
from conflicts may be worth the ultimate assurance of the right
answer. S88
The assumption in these statements that there is always a" right
answer " in these questions is interesting. The truth is apparently
always clear if we only keep on trying to look for it in enough
places. Certainly we should strive our best to get as near the truth
as we can. And long experience has shown that at least one review,
with collective judgment, is an important procedural tool to that
end. But there must be some end to the process. We do not have
two Supreme Courts to produce cdhflicts and a super Supreme
Court to reach the right answers. Mr. Surrey was almost surely
right when he wrote:
Many a tax question is no nearer a "right"' decision after four or five
circuit courts of appeals have battled over it than when tle first court
Cf. the reference to the British Law Ascertainment Act, in note 42 su; a.
Pretty man, The Traynor Proposals- Some Considerations (i 939 ) / z7yTA
MAG;. 397, 440. Cf. Sutherland, New Roads to the Settlement of Tax Controversie
A Critical Comment (19,4o) 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 359, 361.
8Pearce, Trends in Federal Tax Procedure (1940) 69 J. AccouNTANcy
369
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pronounced its judgment. All that has happened is that each of the several reasonable but contradictory positions has been given the stamp of
judicial approval. Meanwhile a confused Bureau and bewildered taxpayers, who would be quite content to adjust themselves to the first decision if it were left unchallenged, are forced to struggle along as best
they can until the Supreme Court selects one of the available alternatives
and it becomes the " right "-answer, at least until Congress acts. . *..89
The delays in the course of justice would be long enough if we did
have a single Court of Tax Appeals.
Moreover, when these objections were written, the tax bar had a
considerable nostalgic memory of the Supreme Court of the early
and middle thirties. How many lawyers would feel now that the
Supreme Court has always reached the "right answer " in recent
years? 90 It is not at all clear that taxpayers and their counsel
would not be better satisfied to have tax decisions made by some
other tribunal.
Much of the opposition based on this ground is simply an expression of the essential overconservatism of the bar. The opposition of lawyers to the abolition of the Circuit Courts in 19I2 was
organized and violent. It was voiced by some of the leaders of the
bar, including Elihu Root 9 ' and Joseph H. Choate.92 The American Bar Association's contribution to the situation was a resolution
requesting Congress to postpone action in order that - after a
89 Shrrey, Some Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administration (1940) 25
WASH. U. L. Q. 399, 419.

90 It would be hard to find a tax lawyer who would prefer, e.g., the Supreme
Court's decision in the Virginian Hotel case to the result reached in Pittsburgh Brewing Co. v. Comm'r (107 F.(2d) 155 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939)). The same might be said
for Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm'r (319 U. S. 590 (1943)), or even the unhappy

Dobson case.
9' Senator Root moved to strike out § 274 from the bill for the Judicial Code in
order that he might "record a vote against the abolition and consolidation of the
circuit and district courts." 46 CONG. REc. 2136 (1911).
92 Mr. Choate headed a list of leading lawyers who memorialized Congress in
protest against the change. See 46 CONG. REc. 298 (19o); (1911) 14 LAW NOTES
225; FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS,

THE

BusINEss

OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927) 133.

Among the arguments advanced by Mr. Choate's committee was the following: "The
change will be unsettling and will substitute a judicial system not understood, and
new, for one well defined and known." This would seem to be a fine illustration of
the view later expressed by Senator Root himself that opposition to change "has
always come from lawyers who had succeeded and were content with things as they
were; who did not want practice and proceedings changed from that with which
they were familiar . . . ." Root, The Layman's Criticism of the Lawyer (1914) 39
A. B. A. REP. 386, 391.
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century's experience - there might be more time for " investigation "! 9 Does it not now seem clear that the change then made
was a highly desirable one, long overdue? It is hard to escape the
feeling that the lawyers' opposition then was simply an instance
of the automatic opposition to any change felt by many members of
the bar unless they force themselves to consider a proposal without
an overwhelming predisposition in favor of the status quo.
Is it not now high time that we take steps to overhaul our creaking system of review in federal tax cases?
Our tax laws are highly complex. Much of the complexity in the
statute is probably unavoidable if we are to have a statute which is
fair. 94 But to add to that complexity the present uncertainty and
confusion throughout most of the period of administration of the
statute is more than we need bear. With the tremendous problems
of an excess profits tax, with intricate statutes like the Revenue
Acts of 1942 and 1943, with provisions like Section 722, a change
in our present procedure in tax appeals has become a clear necessity. We should not try to struggle through the aftermath of recent
tax laws with our present antiquated system of tax review.
Erwin N. Griswold.
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL.

93 See (1910) 35 A. B. A. REP. 48, where the resolution was offered.

The text of

the resolution appears at 46 CONG. REC. 298 (igio). The committee of the Association reported the following year that it "made strenuous efforts to obtain a postponement of Congressional action on the bills." (1911) .36 A. B. A. REP. 387.
94 Cf. Eichholz, Should the Federal Income Tax Be Simplified? (939) 48 YALE
L.
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